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I.  INTRODUCTION 
While debate rages throughout Ohio and elsewhere regarding adopting of 
children by same-sex parents, what cannot be debated is the need for adoptive 
homes.2  Almost 500,000 children in the United States are in foster care awaiting 
                                                                
1Susan Becker is an associate professor of law at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 
Cleveland State University.  She served as legal counsel for the amicus curiae in the In re Jane 
Doe litigation.  Professor Becker wishes to thank her friends and colleagues Barbara Tyler and 
Veronica Dougherty for their comments on various drafts of this article but retains full 
responsibility for any miscues in this piece.   
2See generally ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999); see also Symposium, Adopting More 
Kids: Barriers and Solutions, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 73-151 (1999). 
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102 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:101 
permanent homes.3  In Ohio’s Cuyahoga County alone, 2,700 children are in foster 
care awaiting permanent placements.4  In response to this crushing need, the federal 
government has enacted laws providing financial incentives to states that streamline 
their adoption procedures and place these children in permanent homes.5  
In addition to the need for homes for children without any legally recognized 
parent, the need for a child who already has one legal parent to be adopted by the 
parent’s gay or lesbian partner who is already serving as a de facto parent is very 
important to the child’s emotional stability and material well being.  This type of 
adoption, frequently referred to as a “second-parent” adoption,6 is the focal point of 
this article.  However, the matters discussed herein also apply directly and by 
analogy to situations where gay and lesbian couples and heterosexual unmarried 
couples desire to jointly adopt a child who is a ward of the state.  
There are many ways in which lesbian and gay couples7 seek to become parents 
and form legally recognized families through adoption.  Typical scenarios include a 
gay or lesbian couple without biological children seeking to jointly adopt a child 
through a county child welfare department or a private adoption.  One partner may 
have a biological child from a previous heterosexual relationship, and both the 
biological parent and their partner want the partner to adopt that child. One partner 
may have adopted a child in the United States or in a foreign country, and the other 
partner now wants to also adopt the child.  A gay couple may have involved a 
surrogate mother to have a child, and the non-biological father wishes to adopt the 
child.  A lesbian couple may decide to bring a child into this world together, with 
one becoming the biological mother either through a known or anonymous sperm 
donor, and the non-biological mother may seek to adopt that child.  Any of these 
situations may, of course, involve more than one child.8  
                                                                
3H.R. REP. No. 105-89, at 7-8 (1997) (reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2740). 
4Christopher Quinn, Wanted: Parents; County Adoption Crisis, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 30, 
1999, at A1.  
5See, e.g., Adoption and Safe Family Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89 (providing financial 
incentives for states that increase the number of foster children for whom permanent families 
are established through adoption). 
6Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial 
Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1019 
(1999); Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in a Brave 
New World, 20 J. JUV. L. 1 (1999); Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming 
Barriers to Lesbian Family Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & LAW 175 (1995). 
7The term “gay couple” as used herein means two males who identify themselves as 
homosexual and who are in a committed relationship; a “lesbian couple” means two women in 
this type of relationship.  These definitions also allow for the possibility that one or both 
partners in a couple may identify as bisexual, but each has made a commitment to a 
relationship that would be traditionally defined as homosexual.  
8Vast literature exists on the legal and social ramifications of homosexuals adopting and 
raising children.  Although the author is familiar with these excellent sources of data and 
analysis, they are not extensively cited throughout this piece because the focus here is not on 
the appropriateness of such adoptions generally, but rather the specific situation presented by 
relevant Ohio law.  See generally, authorities cited in footnote 6, supra and footnote 104, 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/13
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Each scenario provides a variety of financial, social, medical and other 
challenges for the partners and their children.  But perhaps the biggest challenge is 
obtaining legal recognition – and thus the numerous safeguards and benefits that 
accompany legally recognized relationships – for this relatively new family 
paradigm.9 
At one end of the spectrum are states that prohibit homosexuals from adopting 
either individually,10 or by denying petitions in what are generically categorized as 
“second-parent adoptions.”11  But a greater number of states have recognized the 
validity of cementing the relationship between the child and her de facto parent by 
allowing the non-biological or non-legally recognized parent to adopt the child.12 
                                                          
infra.  See also, JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY:  RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN 
THE POSTMODERN AGE (1996). 
9Issues of family law, including adoption, have traditionally been within the sovereign 
powers of the states.  Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (subject of domestic 
relations belongs to the laws of the states except in rare occasions when family law comes into 
conflict with federal statute); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890).  Therefore, attempts to invoke 
federal courts and law into family law matters is seldom successful unless a colorable federal 
constitutional issue is presented. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).  The 
Troxel Court, for example, struck down Washington statutes that allowed any person to 
petition the court for visitation rights at any time, and empowered courts to order visitation 
when it “may serve the best interest of the child.”  WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).  
Although the Court splintered in its reasoning for striking down the statute, at least four 
justices agreed that such legislation violated the parents’ constitutional right to custody, care 
and control of their children, a right which the Court characterized as “perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
10As of this writing, Florida and Mississippi are the only states that have statutes explicitly 
prohibiting adoptions by homosexuals.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(d)(3) (West 1999); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2000). See also Cheryl Wetzstein, Mississippi Bans Adoptions 
by Homosexuals; Law Spurred by Vermont Gay Benefits, WASH. TIMES, May 5, 2000, at A1.  
Utah’s Board of Trustees of the Division of Child and Family Services approved two policies 
in March, 2000, which prohibit “cohabiting” adults – defined in a manner that includes gay 
and lesbian couples – from being foster parents and from adopting children.  See Hilary 
Groutage, State Board Adopts Policies on Adoption, Foster Care, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 1, 
2000, at D4.  The policies reflect changes in Utah law that became effective May 1, 2000 that 
prohibit unmarried persons from adopting children.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9(3)(a-b) 
(2000).  A New Hampshire law prohibiting foster parenting and adoption by gays and lesbians 
was repealed effective July 2, 1999.  Norma Love, New Hampshire Repeals 12-Year Ban on 
Child Adoptions by Homosexuals, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 4, 1999, at 4B.  
11See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1998); Georgia G. v. Terry 
M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Wisc. 1994).  The Connecticut court’s decision was trumped by 
state legislation allowing homosexuals and other unmarried persons to adopt their partner’s 
children.  Conn. H.B. 5830 was signed by the governor June 1, 2000.  It allows a person who 
shares parental responsibilities for the child with the child’s parent to adopt or join the 
adoption of a child even though the two adults are not married, provided that the probate court 
finds the proposed adoption in the best interest of the child.    
12See, e.g., M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M. and 
D.M. to Adopt Olivia M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 1995); In re Adoption of Two Children by 
H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 
1993); In re Jacob, 600 N.E.2d 397, 405-06 (N.Y. 1995): Adoptions of B.L.V.D. & E.L.V.B., 
628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993).  As revised in 1995, Vermont’s adoption statute recognized 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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Ohio law regarding second-parent adoptions remains unsettled.  In In re Adoption 
of Jane Doe, the Summit County Court of Appeals, Ninth Appellate District, 
interpreted Ohio law as disallowing second-parent adoption.13  But the Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s refusal to review the case means that the decision is only binding in 
the Ninth District, with other districts being free to accept or reject the rationale of 
the Ninth District opinion.14  
The petitioners in In re Jane Doe are a lesbian couple who decided to become 
parents.  One woman is the biological mother, and her partner is a de facto and 
psychological parent to the child.  Despite the non-biological mother’s loving and 
dutiful acceptance and execution of her parental role from the day of the child’s 
conception to the present, she remains a total stranger to the child in the eyes of the 
law.  The decision in In re Jane Doe ensures that the stranger relationship will 
continue.  As more fully explained below, the rationale employed by the Ninth 
District’s decision to deny the adoption arguably extends to every case where a gay, 
lesbian, or even unmarried heterosexual partner of a parent seeks to adopt the 
partner’s child. 
Section II of this article provides an overview of Ohio adoption law.  Section III 
presents the case of In re Jane Doe, starting with the decision of the lesbian couple to 
jointly bring a child into this world, and continuing with the efforts of both mothers 
to obtain legal recognition for the de facto parent’s status through adoption, and the 
legal strategies employed by the mothers’ attorneys, also addressed are the court-
appointed Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), the social science data supplied by the amicus 
curiae to help the court reach a fully informed decision, and the Ohio courts’ 
rejection of the possibility of second-parent adoptions in Ohio.  Section IV offers a 
critique of the courts’ analysis of the case.  Section V is a brief conclusion.  
II.  OHIO ADOPTION LAW  
The legal principles governing adoption in Ohio are drafted and adopted by the 
Ohio General Assembly and signed into law by the governor.  Ohio adoption law is 
primarily codified in Chapter 3701 of the Ohio Revised Code. Since no statutory 
scheme can cover the myriad issues arising in the adoption context, significant case 
law provides guidance for the interpretation and application of Chapter 3701.   
                                                          
the right to second-parent adoptions.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 1-102 (1999).  At least one 
court in Indiana has allowed second parent adoptions.  See Scott Olson, N.J. Ruling on 
Adoption by Gays Not Likely to be Duplicated by Indiana, Experts Say, IND. LAW., Jan. 7, 
1998, at 11. 
13In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
14Article IV, § 3 of the Ohio constitution establishes the appellate court system. Article IV, 
§ 3(B)(4) provides that when an appeals court announces a decision that conflicts with a 
decision rendered by any of the 11 other courts of appeal in the state, “the judges shall certify 
the record of the case to the supreme court for review and final determination.”  Therefore, it 
is the Supreme Court of Ohio, rather than appeals court, that establishes state-wide precedent.  
Ohio’s courts of appeal are structured pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2501 (West 2000).  
This statute creates twelve appellate districts, with three consisting of only one county each 
(Cuyahoga, Franklin, and Hamilton) and the largest consisting of 17 counties.  OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2501.01 (West 2000).  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/13
2000] SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION 105 
In Ohio, only an agency licensed by the state or an attorney may arrange an 
adoption.15  Persons who may be adopted include a minor, a permanently disabled or 
mentally retarded adult, or an adult who, as a minor, established a child-foster parent 
or child-stepchild relationship with the person seeking to adopt.16  Persons who may 
adopt include “a husband and wife together, at least one of whom is an adult”17 and 
“an unmarried adult.”18  A married adult can adopt without the other spouse joining 
the petition in several circumstances, including where “the other spouse is a parent of 
the person to be adopted and supports the adoption.”19 
The person seeking to adopt must file a petition for adoption20 with the probate 
division of the court of common pleas.21  A home study is usually conducted by an 
“assessor” – traditionally a professional counselor, social worker or psychologist22 - 
“for the purpose of ascertaining whether a person seeking to adopt a minor is suitable 
to adopt.”23  One or more hearings are held to determine whether the legal 
prerequisites are met and whether the facts support a finding that the proposed 
adoption is in the best interest of the person to be adopted.24   
The effects of a final adoption decree include creating “the relationship of parent 
and child between petitioner and the adopted person, as if the adopted person were a 
                                                                
15OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.011 (West 2000). 
16OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02 (West 2000). 
17OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(A) (West 2000). 
18OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(B) (West 2000). 
19OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(D)(1) (West 2000).  Consent to adoptions must be 
obtained from a mother, father, or putative father whose rights will be terminated by the 
adoption, by any agency that has permanent custody of the child, and the minor being adopted 
if more than 12 years of age.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.06, 3107.081 (West 2000). 
20OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.031 (West 2000).  Procedures in probate courts are 
governed by Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure “except to the extent that by their nature they 
would be clearly inapplicable,” OHIO R. CIV. P. 73(A), and local rules of court promulgated 
under the authority delegated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in OHIO R. CIV. P. 83(B).  Forms 
used in probate court are prescribed by Rule 51 of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts 
of Ohio enacted by the Supreme Court of Ohio.  See OHIO R. CIV. P. 73(H); SUP. R. 51.  
However, the rules allow “an original pleading” to be prepared for filing which modifies the 
information required in the applicable form as the particular case or proceeding requires.  SUP. 
R. 51(C)(2). 
21The petition for adoption can be filed in the county where the person to be adopted was 
born, or where, “at the time of filing the petition, the petitioner or the person to be adopted or 
parent of the person to be adopted resides.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.04(A) (West 2000).  
The probate courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings.  State, 
ex rel. Portage Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6 (Ohio 1974). 
22OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.012 (West 2000). 
23OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.031 (West 2000).  The person conducting the home study, 
known as an “assessor” under Ohio law, must have specific credentials and training as set 
forth in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.012 (West 2000). 
24OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.14 (West 2000).  See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3107.011 (West 2000).  
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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legitimate blood descendant of the petitioner, for all purposes including inheritance 
and applicability of statutes, documents, and instruments. . . .”25  The final decree also 
makes the adopted person “a stranger to the adopted person’s former relatives for all 
purposes.”26  As discussed later in this article,27 this statutory severance from former 
relatives formed the basis of the trial and appellate court decisions in In Re Adoption 
of Jane Doe to bar gay men and lesbians from adopting their partners’ children 
unless the biological parent/partners’ rights are terminated.   
In general, Ohio courts have interpreted the adoption statutes liberally to ensure 
that the best interests of the child are met.  In fact, Ohio’s highest court has 
acknowledged that “strict construction does not require that we interpret [adoption] 
statutes in such a manner that would mandate an unjust or unreasonable result.”28  In 
one case, the Supreme Court of Ohio overrode the statutory mandate requiring 
agency approval of a proposed adoption, ruling that the probate court is empowered 
to disregard that statutory requirement when it is in the best interest of the child to do 
so.29 
In terms of adoption by gay men or lesbians, perhaps the most important thing is 
what the statute and case law do not hold: there is no statutory nor is there a common 
law prohibition against homosexuals or unmarried individuals adopting in Ohio.  The 
possibility that adoptions by homosexuals would be per se prohibited by courts 
based on public policy or upon a “best interest of the child” analysis was soundly 
rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of In re Charles B. 30 
The petitioner in Charles B was a gay man who cohabitated with his male 
partner.  Mr. B had been a foster parent of a young boy for several years.  The 
probate court held that the adoption was in the child’s best interest, but the appeals 
court reversed, finding that, as a matter of law, homosexuals are not allowed to 
adopt.  “The court of appeals stated, in effect, that it could never be in a child’s best 
interest to be adopted by a person such as Mr. B.”31 
The Supreme Court of Ohio reinstated the adoption, finding that the proposed 
adoption by Mr. B satisfied the threshold statutory requirements of the child being a 
minor and the petitioner being an unmarried adult.32  Thus, the only remaining issue 
was whether the adoption would be beneficial to the child.  The court explained: 
“The polestar by which courts in Ohio, and courts around the country, have been 
guided is the best interest of the child to be adopted.  This standard is applied in 
                                                                
25OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(2) (West 2000). 
26OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(1) (West 2000). Similar provisions are found in 
other states.  See Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On 
Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REV. 
1021, nn. 6 & 7 (1999). 
27See discussion infra 18-19 & 30-33. 
28In re Adoption of Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ohio 1996) (word in bracket added). 
29State ex rel. Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 11-12 (Ohio 
1974). 
30552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990). 
31Id. at 886. 
32Id. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/13
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every adoption case and the case before us can be no different.”33  The court further 
instructed the probate court to “consider all relevant factors before determining what 
is in the child’s best interest,” and then to exercise its “broad discretion in making 
the determination” on the adoption petition.34   
Thus, Mr. B was allowed to adopt his son.  As Mr. B’s partner did not seek to 
adopt the child, the court did not address the legality of that possibility. 
It is against this statutory and common-law backdrop that In re Adoption of Jane 
Doe was litigated. 
III.  IN RE ADOPTION OF JANE DOE35 
A.  Factual Background 
Trish Smith and Marcia Jones became life partners in 1981.36  They were united 
as a couple in a Quaker union ceremony and consider themselves married in the eyes 
of their religion even if not recognized in the eyes of the law.37  After being together 
about eight years, they decided to bring a child into the world.38  Their daughter, Jane 
Doe, was born on July 28, 1990, in Akron, Ohio.39  Marcia is Jane’s biological 
mother.40   
Jane was conceived through artificial insemination at a hospital using a sperm 
bank.41  Since the sperm donor was anonymous, there is no biological father of record 
or in the eyes of the law. 42 
Since Jane’s birth, Marcia and Trish have shared in the parenting responsibilities 
of the child, and Jane has, by all accounts, flourished under the loving care provided 
by her parents.43  For the first few years, Trish financially supported her family so 
                                                                
33Id. 
34Id. at 889. 
35Pseudonyms were used throughout the appellate proceedings and in this article to protect 
identity of the child.  The pleadings, motions, court orders and other documents in the probate 
court record contain the parties’ real names.  That record has been sealed to protect the parties’ 
identities.  The sealed record necessitates reliance on the briefs filed at the appellant level to 
document what occurred at the trial level.  Attorneys Peter Cahoon and James Chapman of 
Akron, Ohio, and Patricia Logue of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund’s 
Midwest Office served as legal counsel for the petitioners. 
36Brief for Appellants at 7, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1998). 
37Brief for Appellants at 9. 
38Id. at 8. 
39Id. at 7. 
40Id. at 6. 
41Brief for Appellants at 8; Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 2, In re Adoption of Jane Doe,  
719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
42Id.  See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (West 2000); In re Adoption of Zschach, 
665 N.E.2d 1070, 1073-74 (Ohio 1996).  
43Brief for Appellants at 7 - 10. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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that Marcia could stay home and care for Jane.44  Persons acquainted with Trish, 
Marcia, and Jane through Jane’s school, day care, neighbors, faith community, 
friends and relatives submitted affidavits that they are a happy, healthy family.45  
Despite this de facto parent-child relationship between Trish and Jane, the two 
remain total strangers in the eyes of the law.  For example, Jane cannot be covered 
under Trish’s health insurance policy – in this case it is an important issue because 
Jane suffers from ulcerative colitis that requires expensive medication and may 
require hospitalization from time to time.46  If anything happens to Marcia, Jane may 
not be able to obtain insurance due to this pre-existing condition.47  Also, Trish is a 
beneficiary to an inter vivos family trust; if Jane were her natural or adopted 
daughter, Jane could inherent from this trust.48 
Perhaps more important than health insurance or financial concerns are the 
psychological benefits and emotional security Jane would have if her relationship 
with each of her moms is recognized and protected by the law.49  If legally 
recognized through adoption, the relationship between Trish and Jane would be 
preserved, even if Trish and Marcia ever go their separate ways.  In that event, the 
court would decide custody and visitation arrangements; if that happened now, Trish 
would have a very difficult time trying to even get visitation rights to see Jane50 and 
custody is virtually out of the question. 
If Marcia becomes incapacitated or dies, necessitating appointment of a guardian 
for Jane, Trish would be a stranger to Jane in the eyes of the law.51  In terms of legal 
                                                                
44Id. at 8. 
45Id. 
46Id. at 10. 
47Id. at 11. 
48Brief for Appellants at 11.  
49Id. at 12. 
50See Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APO1-137, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS  3627 (Franklin Cty. 
Aug. 12, 1997) (unreported) (asserting that lesbian and/or homosexual partners have neither 
statutory nor equitable rights to court-ordered visitation with children those partners raised 
jointly with the birth or other legal parent of the child). 
51The law allows Marcia to use a power of attorney to designate her intent that Trish be 
appointed Jane’s guardian in the event of Marcia’s incapacity; Marcia can also include a 
testamentary guardianship clause in her will indicating her intent that Trish be made Jane’s 
legal guardian if Marcia dies.  Neither of these options guarantees that Marcia’s wishes will be 
followed.  Probate courts are not bound to following the testamentary guardianship if the court 
determines, in its discretion, that such guardianship is not in the best interest of the child.  
Henicle v. Flack, 3 Ohio App. 444 (1914).  See generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Function, 
Power and Discretion of Court Where There is a Testamentary Appointment of Guardian of 
Minor, 67 A.L.R.2d 803 (1999).  The validity of a durable power of attorney can be 
challenged on a number of grounds. Issues regarding whether the attorney is acting in good 
faith are often raised, and transfers of power from the principal to attorney in fact are highly 
scrutinized by the court to assure fairness and fundamental soundness of the transfer.  See, 
e.g., In re Scott, 675 N.E.2d 1350 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Testa v. Roberts, 542 N.E.2d 654 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/13
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standing, any blood relative of  Marcia, and thus of Jane, would have superior legal 
rights regarding Jane even if that person had never met Jane. 
B.  Initiation of Adoption Procedures and Probate Court’s Ruling 
On October 16, 1996, the parents52 filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in 
the Probate Division of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas.  The complaint 
sought a declaration that Trish could adopt Jane so that both parents would have full 
legal standing as parents.  On June 5, 1997, the trial judge denied the relief 
requested, holding that Trish could not adopt Jane under Ohio law unless the 
biological mother’s (Marcia’s) rights were terminated.53  
The probate court vacated this decision and allowed the parents to amend their 
declaratory judgment complaint and submit additional briefing as to whether, in the 
alternative, both parents could jointly adopt Jane upon the simultaneous termination 
of Marcia’s rights as birth mother.54   
In sum, through the initial and amended complaint for declaratory relief, parents 
Trish and Marcia asked the probate court to: 
1) Declare that Trish could adopt Jane without any loss of parental rights 
to Marcia;55 or 
2) Declare that Trish and Marcia could jointly adopt without Marcia 
relinquishing her parental rights;56 or 
3) Declare that Marcia could relinquish her parental rights to Jane 
instantaneously with the granting of the adoption to both Trish and 
Marcia.57   
The probate court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (hereafter “GAL”) to advise 
the court on legal issues surrounding the adoption.58  Consistent with the GAL’s 
interpretation of the law, the probate court concluded that Trish met Ohio’s statutory 
requirement of being a suitable person to adopt, but that the adoption would 
automatically terminate Marcia’s parental rights.  This decision was based on a strict 
application of a statutory provision that states: “a final decree of adoption . . . shall 
have the following effects . . . except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner . . . to 
relieve the biological . . . parents . . . of all parental rights.”59   
Accordingly, in an opinion issued March 4, 1998, the probate court denied all 
relief requested by Trish and Marcia.  The probate court reasoned60 that R.C. 
                                                                
52Since Marcia is the biological parent of Jane and Trish is Jane’s de facto parent, the term 
“parents” is used throughout this article to refer collectively to Trish and Marcia.  
53Brief for Appellants at 7. 
54Id.  
55Id. at 6-7, 11. 
56Id. at 7, 11. 
57Id.  
58Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 2, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1998). 
59OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(1) (West 2000). 
60The probate court decision did not use pseudonyms, and all parts of the record that refer 
to the parties by their real names are sealed.  Therefore, references to the probate court’s 
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§ 3107.15(A)(1)61 allows retention of parental rights of a child by the biological 
parent only when the spouse of the biological parent, i.e. the stepparent of the child, 
is adopting the child.62  In cases such as Jane’s, where the person seeking to adopt is 
not a legally recognized spouse63 of the biological parent, the probate court 
interpreted R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) as automatically terminating the biological 
mother’s rights upon adoption by someone other than the spouse/stepparent.  In 
short, the probate court held that the “stepparent provision” found in R.C. 
§ 3107.15(A)(1) did not prohibit Trish from adopting Jane, but held that this 
adoption would automatically terminate Marcia’s parental rights.64 
The probate court also rejected the argument advanced by the parents that the 
appropriate focus on “the best interest of the child”65 negated application of the 
stepparent provision to terminate Marcia’s rights upon Trish’s adoption of Jane. 
The probate court provided two reasons for rejecting the parents’ argument that 
the “best interest of the child” mandated approval of this adoption.  First, the probate 
court held that the parents’ argument would be more plausible if the case involved an 
abandoned child or a child without a parent.  In that situation, the “best interest of the 
child” could be employed to avoid strict statutory construction.66  But since Jane 
already has one natural parent, the court concluded that the need for adoption is not 
so critical to the child’s best interest.  The court reasoned that “[s]ince the child in 
this case has a natural parent, and the need for an adoptive parent is not as pressing 
as the non-parent situation, the child’s interest must be given less weight when 
weighed against the clear legislative mandate of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1).”67 
Second, the court reasoned that because adoption in Ohio is a creature of statute, 
strict compliance is necessary, especially where the language is as clear as the 
stepparent adoption provision of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) appeared to this court.68  
                                                          
decision herein are, as evidenced by the accompanying footnotes, based on statements about 
or summaries of the probate court’s decision as presented (1) in the briefs filed with Ninth 
District Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio and (2) in the court of appeal’s In re 
Jane Doe opinion published at 719 N.E.2d 1071 (1998).  
61Brief for Appellants at 7.  In relevant part, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(1) (West 
2000) provides that a “final decree of adoption . . . shall have the following effects . . . except 
with respect to a spouse of the petitioner …to relieve the biological … parents … of all 
parental rights.” 
62Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 3. 
63
“Spouse” is not defined in Ohio’s adoption statutes.   The probate court consulted case 
law and a dictionary to conclude that “spouse” means “one’s husband or wife” and connotes a 
heterosexual relationship.  Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 3, n.5.  
64Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 3; Brief for Appellants at 15. 
65As previously noted, the “best interest of the child” standard pervades Ohio’s statutory 
adoption scheme.  See e.g. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.11, 3107.14 (West 2000).  See also 
In re Adoption of Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (1996) (“goal of adoption statutes is to 
protect the best interests of the child.”).  
66Brief for Appellants at 16. 
67Id. 
68See In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1072 (explaining reason of probate 
court’s decision).  
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The probate court did not explicitly address the parents’ independent, alternative 
argument that Ohio law allows Trish and Marcia, each independently eligible to 
adopt as an “unmarried adult”69 under Ohio law, to both adopt Jane upon the 
simultaneous and instantaneous voluntary termination by Marcia of her parental 
rights.70   
C.  Parents’ Arguments in the Court of Appeals   
The parents appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, Summit 
County, but the appeal was actually heard by three judges from the Fifth District at 
the request of and on behalf of the Ninth District.71  The parents raised two 
assignments of error deserving de novo review:72 
1) The trial court erred in holding that it has no authority to grant the 
adoption of Jane by de facto parent Trish without terminating 
biological parent  Marcia’s rights; and 
2) The trial court erred by failing to declare that it had the authority to let 
Marcia legally relinquish her rights along with instantaneous adoption 
of Jane by both Marcia and Trish.73 
In support of their arguments, the parents directed the appeals court’s attention to 
several Supreme Court of Ohio and Ohio court of appeals decisions where the courts 
had rejected literal application of the statutory requirements to serve the best 
interests of a child.74 Appellants primarily based this argument on cases such as 
Summers,75 where the Supreme Court of Ohio empowered probate courts to disregard 
certain statutory bars to an adoption where the adoption was in the child’s best 
interest.   
Pairing this ample weight of authority with the best-interest-of-the-child mandate 
that permeates the letter and the spirit of Ohio’s adoption statutes, the parents argued 
that “literal application of R.C. § 3107.15 is inappropriate because it would not serve 
the goals of the act, and would produce an unjust result contrary to Jane’s best 
interests.”76  Appellants continued: 
                                                                
69R.C. § 3107.03(B) allows “an unmarried adult” to adopt.  Under Ohio’s rules of statutory 
interpretation, references to singular include the plural and vice versa.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1.43(A) (West 2000).  Thus, R.C. § 3107.03(B) allows for “unmarried adults” to adopt.   
70
“The court below either did not address these arguments or thought this option 
foreclosed under the [Ohio adoption] act.”  Brief for Appellants at 38. 
71This transfer was made at the request of the Ninth District judges but the reasons for the 
request remain part of the sealed record.  
72Brief for Appellants at 5; Appellants Reply Brief at 1-2.  The parents argued that de 
novo review was appropriate because the appeal arose from a declaratory judgment action 
involving questions of law. 
73Brief for Appellants at 5, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1998).  
74Brief for Appellants at 17-22. 
75As previously noted, the Summers court instructed the probate court to disregard the 
statutory requirement that agency consent be obtained for an adoption.  State, ex rel. Portage 
Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 11-12 (Ohio 1974).  
76Brief for Appellants at 22.  
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The provisions of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) preserving the rights of a 
biological or other legal parent in stepparent adoption demonstrates that 
the legislature already has recognized in comparable circumstances that 
maintaining a child’s legal relationship with her parent serves a 
compelling and paramount purpose.  The same is true here where, from 
Jane’s perspective, the exact same interests are at stake.  Even though the 
legislature may not have had Jane’s circumstances in mind [when it 
enacted R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1)], the court must elevate them above all else 
in construing the act, particularly when no other person’s interests will be 
infringed.77 
In short, the parents argued that the court had not only the right, but the duty, to 
allow Trish’s adoption of Jane because it was not prohibited by Ohio law and was in 
Jane’s best interest. 
D.  Guardian Ad Litem’s Role on Appeal  
In her appellate brief, the GAL advised the court that probate court had appointed 
her to respond to the legal issues raised in the declaratory judgment filed by the 
parents seeking clarification that Trish was a proper party to adopt Jane.78  While this 
is not an unprecedented role for a GAL,79 it differs from the statutorily designed GAL 
role as advocate for the child.80  In fulfilling the task assigned by the court, and in 
concluding that Jane’s adoption should not be allowed as the parents desired, the 
GAL became an adversary to the parents and arguably to Jane as well.  Accordingly, 
the GAL’s role on appeal was directly analogous to that of an appellee defending the 
lower court’s decision. 
In urging affirmance of the probate judge’s decision, the GAL stated that she did 
not independently verify the facts presented by the parents in their affidavits and in 
                                                                
77Id. at 22 (bracketed material supplied). 
78Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 2. 
79In a New Jersey case, for example, a law professor was appointed to advise the court 
whether the adoption by a same-sex partner of the biological mother was (1) in the child’s best 
interest and (2) compatible with New Jersey statutory law and public policy.  Adoption of a 
Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 551 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).  The J.M.G. court also 
appointed a social service agency to make an additional assessment and recommendation as to 
the child’s best interest.  Id.  
80Ohio law authorizes appointment of a GAL in cases of abuse or neglect or when a minor 
faces being adjudged delinquent or unruly and has no parent or guardian to advocate on the 
child’s behalf, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281 (West 2000), and when child custody is at 
issue in a divorce case.  OHIO R. CIV. P. 75.  The GAL may be an attorney who serves as legal 
counsel for the child.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(H) (West 2000). If a conflict 
develops in the GAL’s efforts to act as factual investigator/advocate and legal counsel, the 
court can relieve the GAL of her duties as legal counsel and she can continue as a factual 
investigator and advocate for the child’s best interest.  Id.  If the GAL is not an attorney, the 
court can appoint legal counsel to advise the GAL.  Id.  In sum, “[t]he role of the guardian ad 
litem is to investigate the ward’s situation and then to ask the court to do what the guardian 
feels is in the ward’s best interest.”  In re Baby Girl Baxter, 479 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ohio 1985).  
If the GAL is also an attorney, the role also includes the duty to “zealously represent” the 
child’s legal rights.  Id.  
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briefs regarding Jane’s home life, but assumed the facts were true in briefing the 
legal issues.81 
The GAL’s role as de facto appellee urging affirmance of the lower court’s 
decision resulted in her framing of the issues on appeal very differently than the 
perspective presented by the parents.  The GAL opinioned that “[t]his case is not 
about the best interests of the child per se as asserted by Appellants.  It is about 
whether Ohio law allows the adoption they seek.”82  Contrary to the parents’ assertion 
that the appeal involved a declaratory judgment based purely on  questions of law, 
and thus deserving de novo review,83 the GAL claimed that the probate judge’s 
decision was reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard.84 
The GAL conceded that “[t]here is no question that Trish may adopt Jane under 
Ohio law” because “[s]he is an ‘unmarried adult’ who may adopt pursuant to R.C. 
§ 3107.03(B).”85  The GAL further recognized the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision 
In re Adoption of Charles B that Trish’s sexual orientation was not a bar to the 
adoption.86  However, the GAL posited that probate court was bound to strictly 
interpret the statutes,87 and that the best interest test should not be applied to statutory 
construction.88   
The GAL argued: 
Appellants confuse the analysis a probate court would apply when 
considering a petition for adoption with the question of whether two 
unmarried adults can adopt under the statutes of Ohio as raised in their 
declaratory judgment complaint.  The question of statutory construction is 
governed by analysis of the applicable statutes using rules of construction.  
While Appellants devote the majority of their brief to the best interests 
test, their assertions are premature as the appropriateness of this particular 
adoption is not yet at issue.89 
Finally, the GAL claimed that if policy interests required a different law, then it was 
up to the legislature, not the courts, to make that change after full debate of the 
policy ramifications.90 
                                                                
81Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 3. 
82Id. at 2. 
83Brief for Appellants at 5; Appellants Reply Brief at 1-2. 
84Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 4. 
85Id. at 3, 7. 
86Id.  
87Id. at 4, 7. 
88Id. at 7-10. 
89Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 7. 
90Id. at 6-7. 
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E. Amici Curiae Weigh In  
The Ohio Psychological Association, the National Association of Social Workers 
(NASW), the Ohio Chapter of NASW, the American Academy of Child & 
Adolescent Psychiatry, the Ohio Human Rights Bar Association, and the 
Lesbian/Gay Community Service Center of Greater Cleveland all weighed in as 
amici curiae favoring the adoption.  No amicus briefs opposing the adoption were 
filed. 
Embracing the traditional amici curiae role, these organizations addressed neither 
the factual issue of whether Jane’s adoption by Trish was in the child’s best interest 
nor the legal issue of whether the probate court had misapplied Ohio’s statutory 
adoption scheme.  Rather, amici offered empirical data and other relevant 
information about gay parents and adoptions in an effort to expand the justices’ 
vision as to the impact of the case on families and children in Ohio and elsewhere.   
For example, the amici pointed out that lower court’s ruling prohibits not just gay 
partners of people who have children from adopting, but also prevents any unmarried 
couples from adopting a child.91  The amici explained that “[b]ecause children today 
are being raised, and raised well, by grandparents, single parents, lesbian and gay 
parents, and in other nontraditional family arrangements, standing to file adoption 
petitions should not be construed so narrowly that children in need of stable, safe 
homes will not find them.”92 
Amici also explained, again based on strong empirical evidence, that a child’s 
attachment to his or her “psychological parent” is extremely well-documented and 
important, and that disruption to that relationship for any period of time can be 
exceedingly detrimental to the child.93  In turn, allowing adoption by unmarried 
couples is “an important first step toward protecting the child’s psychological ties” to 
this de facto parent.94 
In addition to psychological harm, the child may experience material deprivation 
if the second parent is not allowed to adopt, amici explained.95  For example, parents 
covered by separate health insurance plans can choose the coverage that is optimal 
for the child’s needs.96  If the de facto parent has no will or if a will is invalidated, 
lost, or successfully contested, Ohio law will protect the ability of an adopted child 
to inherent through intestate succession.97  The adoption decree will also make the 
                                                                
91Brief Amicus Curiae of Ohio Psychological Association, National Association of Social 
Workers and Ohio Chapter American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Ohio 
Human Rights Bar Association, and The Lesbian/Gay Community Service Center of Greater 
Cleveland in Support of Appellants at 5, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1998). 
92Id.  
93Brief Amicus Curiae at 6. 
94Id. 
95Id. at 8. 
96Id.  
97Id.  See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(2) (West 2000) (the effect of adoption 
is “to create the relationship of parent and child . . . as if the adopted person were a legitimate 
blood descendant of the petitioner, for all purposes including inheritance”). 
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child eligible for family trusts98 and social security death or disability benefits 
available to the child of a disabled or deceased parent.99  In contrast, the de facto 
child remains a stranger in the eyes of the law and is to receive no benefits or 
inheritance upon the disability or death of the parent. 
Amici also pointed out the well-documented need for interpretation of adoption 
statutes to help expand, rather than restrict, the potential number of homes available 
for the hundreds of thousands of children in foster homes awaiting placement in 
permanent homes.100  Further, amici explained that the concept of what constitutes a 
family has changed significantly in this culture, and urged the court to make its 
decision consistent with modern realities of children being raised by step-parents, 
grandparents, friends, relatives, and gay and lesbian partners of the legally 
recognized parent rather than relying solely on the prototypical model of family life 
of a biological mother and biological father.101  Amici observed: 
Other nontraditional family arrangements and alternative methods of 
creating such families also exist.  There are single men and women who 
are adopting children; gay and lesbian couples who are becoming parents 
through adoption, foster care, or artificial insemination; divorced parents 
who are marrying new spouses, and, through the advances of medical 
science, post-menopausal women who are becoming mothers.  Again, as a 
result of these new family contexts, courts have avoided a narrow 
definition of “family” and sought to meet the needs of children 
consistently with the goal of protecting the best interest of the child.102  
Additionally, amici brought to the court’s attention the fact that millions of 
children103 are being raised – and raised well104 – by gay or lesbian parents.  Strong 
empirical data demonstrates that such children are not adversely affected by their 
                                                                
98Brief Amicus Curiae at 8.  
99Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402[d]); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 326 (Mass. 1993); 
In re Jacob, 600 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re 
Adoption of J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 552 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).  
100Brief Amicus Curiae at 9. 
101Id. at  10-13. 
102Id. at 12. 
103Id. at 13-25.  Amici explained that estimates of the number of children of gay and 
lesbian parents “range from six million, see J. SCHULENBERG, GAY PARENTING (1985), to eight 
to ten million, see ABA Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law Experts, 13 FAM. L. 
REP. 1512, 1513 (1987), to six to fourteen million, Charlottee J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian 
and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1992).”  Brief Amicus Curiae at 13, n.17. 
104Authorities amici brought to the court’s attention in support of the parenting skills of 
gay and lesbian parents include Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the 
Sexual Orientation of Their Children? Findings from a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian 
Families, 32(1) DEV. PSYCHOL. 3 (1996); Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual 
Abuse by Homosexuals?, PEDIATRICS, July 1994, at 41-44; Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of 
Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD. DEV. 1025 (1992); Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian Mothers: 
Psychosocial Assumptions in Family Law, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 941 (1989); and FREDERICK 
W. BOZETT, GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS (1987). 
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parents’ sexual orientation.  To the contrary, the data confirm that variances in sexual 
orientation constitute a healthy aspect of human diversity, that children with gay 
parents are able to deal with any stigmatization or harassment just as children of 
other minorities do, that children raised by gay men and lesbian women are not more 
likely to become homosexuals than children raised by heterosexuals, and that there is 
no connection – other than outdated myths – between sexual orientation and child 
sexual abuse.105 
F.  Court of Appeals Decision 
The appellate court rejected the arguments of the parents and amici, holding that 
the court below had not erred in (1) applying R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) to determine that 
Trish could not adopt Jane without terminating Marcia’s parental rights; and (2) 
ruling that Ohio law did not allow Marcia and Trish to jointly adopt Jane upon 
Marcia’s instantaneous relinquishment of her parental rights to Jane.106 
The appeals court determined that Trish met the requirements of “an unmarried 
adult” allowed to adopt under R.C. § 3107.03(B)107 and that no statutory provisions 
barred her adoption of Jane.  But in the appeals court’s view, “the gravamen of this 
appeal is what the effect of an adoption by appellant, ‘an unmarried adult,’ is on the 
parental rights of the biological mother”108 pursuant to R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) – a 
classic “step-parent” provision.109 
The court either did not consider, or considered but rejected without explanation, 
the possibility that the stepparent provision was inapplicable to the facts of the case.  
Rather, the court viewed R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) as establishing a bright-line, 
universally applicable rule “that a final decree of adoption issued by an Ohio court 
has the effect of terminating all parental rights of biological parents and creating 
parental rights in adoptive parents.”110  
In reaching this conclusion, the appeals court agreed with the probate court and 
GAL that since adoption is a creature of statute rather than of common law, the 
courts must strictly construe the statutory provisions governing adoption.111  Braced 
with this perspective, the court rejected the parents’ and amici’s argument that 
Ohio’s adoption statutes and Supreme Court of Ohio precedent allowed, if not 
required, an analysis and interpretation of the adoption statute on a case-by-case 
                                                                
105Brief Amicus Curiae at 13-25. 
106In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).  Although not 
explicitly articulated in its ruling, the Court of Appeals reviewed the case on a de novo rather 
than an abuse of discretion standard. 
107Id. at 1072. 
108Id.  
109See, e.g., In re Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035, 1057 (Conn. 1999); Bates v. Sanchez, 375 
N.W.2d 353, 354 (Mich. 1985).  See generally Barbara Findlay, All in the Family Values, 14 
CAN. J. FAM. L. 129 (1997). 
110719 N.E.2d at 1072.  
111Id.  The court later added: “we are adhering to the maxim ‘adoption statues are in 
derogation of common law and therefore must be strictly construed . . .’”  719 N.E.2d at 1073, 
quoting In re Adoption of Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ohio 1996). 
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basis, and also rejected their argument that courts had the power to decline to apply 
the literal language of the statutory provisions when doing so is in a particular child’s 
best interests.112 
The appeals court distinguished the Ohio precedent relied upon by appellants by 
reasoning that previous cases allowing lower courts to decline to apply the literal 
language of a provision in the adoption statute “emphasized the trial court’s 
discretion in determining eligibility to adopt,”113 while it characterized the case 
before it as involving only “the effects of adoption.”114  The court characterized the 
distinction between eligibility and effect as a “tremendous trifle” that was the 
determinative factor in the case.115  It explained: 
Although we are mindful of the dilemma facing the parties and are 
sympathetic to their plight, it is not within the constitutional scope of 
judicial power to change the face and effect of the plain meaning of R.C. 
§ 3107.15.  This case is not about alternative lifestyles but statutory 
construction.  When we balance the spirit and motivation of the adoption 
laws (as appellant argues) against the plain meaning of the statutory 
language created by the state legislature, we are not empowered to find 
the ‘spirit’ includes the issue presented sub judice. 
Appellant argues we should use the best interest of the child test in 
interpreting the statute. We find to do so would place the ‘cart before the 
horse.’ Best interest pertains to the adoption process, not to the legal 
effects of adoption.  Based on the clear meaning of R.C. § 3107.15(A), we 
find the trial court did not err in finding the biological mother’s parental 
rights would terminate upon adoption of the child by appellant, a non-
stepparent.116 
As to the issue of whether Marcia could voluntarily terminate her rights 
simultaneously with the court granting a joint adoption by her and Trish, the court 
said this issue was moot in light of its previous holding.117  
One member of the tribunal penned a concurrence to emphasize his belief that the 
case presented a matter for the legislature, not the courts:118   
Until such time as the General Assembly of Ohio changes the law 
pertaining to same-sex marriages or rewrites the adoption statutes to 
specifically allow the requested legal relationship, I cannot interpret into 
the existing adoption statute a spousal relationship between two 
                                                                
112Id.  
113Id. 
114Id.  This was the position advocated by the GAL.  See Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 9. 
115719 N.E.2d at 1073. 
116Id.  
117Id. at 1073. 
118Id. (Wise, J., concurring). 
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individuals of the same sex such as to create a step-parent relationship in a 
legal context.119 
G.  Seeking Review by the Supreme Court of Ohio 
1.  The Parents’ Arguments in Support of Jurisdiction 
The parents had no appeal as a right to the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Rather, they 
had to convince the court, by filing a memorandum in support of jurisdiction, that 
their case presented issues “of public or great general interest.”120 
The parents argued that further review of this case was of great public interest 
because the result effected a gross injustice to Jane and children similarly situated.  It 
deprived such children of the emotional and financial security that would accompany 
adoption by a second (non-spousal) parent.121  It is also of great public interest, the 
parents contended, to “restore the probate courts to their paramount position as 
protectors of children in adoption proceedings.”122  “Trial courts in at least sixteen 
other states have approved such adoptions, and many thousands of couples nationally 
have secured their child’s best interests through this mechanism,” the parents wrote, 
adding that “Ohio children are no less in need of this vital legal safeguard.”123  They 
further argued: 
American society is awash in discussion of the needs of changing families 
and the rights of its gay and lesbian citizens.  This court has set an 
enviable standard in past cases for deciding these issues dispassionately, 
in the light of the best interests of the children before it, proven facts and 
the application of settled law.  That is all appellants ask here.124  
Touching on the merits of the case, the parents asserted that the trial and 
appellate courts’ interpretation of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) was incorrect because they 
constituted “slavish application of the literal terms of Ohio statutes” without due 
regard of the “unjust and unreasonable results” in this and similar cases.125   The 
parents also argued that any barriers to Jane’s adoption presented by the stepparent 
                                                                
119Id. 
120OHIO SUP. CT. R 3.  Memos in support of jurisdiction put an attorney’s advocacy skills 
to the test.  The primary objective is, of course, to convince the court that the case is of 
significant public interest.  But the memorandum also presents an opportunity to make 
preliminary arguments as to the merits of the appeal.  Compelling preliminary arguments on 
the merits, in turn, may inspire the court to take the case to correct an injustice, to clarify the 
law, or to establish new standards in a given area of law, because accomplishing such tasks is 
so clearly in the public’s interest. 
121Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellants Trish Smith and Marcia Jones.  
In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 86 Ohio St.3d 1408 (Ohio 1999) (hereinafter “Appellants’ 
Memorandum in Support”). 
122Appellants’ Memorandum in Support at 2. 
123Id. at 3. 
124Id. 
125Id. at 6. 
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statute were, contrary to the decisions of the courts below, irrelevant to the issue of 
the parents’ ability to jointly adopt Jane upon the simultaneous relinquishment by the 
biological mother’s parental rights.126  
2.  The Amici Perspective  
The Amici enumerated six reasons that the case satisfied the court’s “public or 
great general interest” criteria.127  These grounds included providing the court with 
the opportunities “to reinvigorate the ‘best interest of the child’ mandate,”128 to 
“preempt repetitive and perhaps conflicting efforts by the lower courts in Ohio” 
adjudicating second-parent adoption cases,129 to establish the right for Jane and 
children similarly situated to “have two parents legally obligated to care for them,”130 
and to “forge a leadership role in the development and evolution of family law 
jurisprudence that recognizes the realities of children’s lives.”131 
The Amici Memorandum also provided, in significantly condensed manner, 
empirical data on the value of two-parent households and the excellent quality of life 
enjoyed by children of same-sex couples.132  
3.  The GAL’s Opposition to Further Review 
The GAL asserted that the case was not of great public interest because “[t]he 
great public interest debate they [appellants] seek to wage is a matter of public policy 
soundly lodged in the province of the legislature.”133  The GAL cited the presence of 
Amici as evidence that “there may be a significant number of interested parties who 
should have the opportunity to weigh in on the public policy issues associated with 
the extension of the adoption laws.”134  
In defending the merits of the decisions below, the GAL made two arguably 
incongruous arguments.135  First, the GAL argued that this was a declaratory 
judgment matter, not an adoption case, and therefore the “best interest of the child” 
standard was not applicable.  “This is not an adoption case; it is a declaratory 
judgment action in which the Appellants urge the courts to judicially legislate,” the 
                                                                
126Id. at 13-14. 
127Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction Submitted in Support of Appellants by Amicus 
Curiae, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 86 Ohio St.3d 1408 (Ohio 1999) (hereinafter “Amici 
Memorandum”). 
128Amici Memorandum at 5. 
129Id. 
130Id. at 5-6. 
131Id. at 6. 
132Id. at 7-14. 
133Memorandum in Response to Appellants’ Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction, In 
re Adoption of Jane Doe, 86 Ohio St.3d 1408 (Ohio 1999) (hereinafter “GAL’S 
Memorandum”). 
134Id. 
135See GAL’s Memorandum. 
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GAL wrote.  Thus, “[t]he best interests of the child test, while appropriate in an 
adoption case, is not appropriate in the action filed by Appellants.”136   
Second, the GAL opined that since the adoption law governing disposition of this 
case is in derogation of common law, adoption statutes must be strictly and narrowly 
construed.137  “The court of appeals found that R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) was not 
ambiguous in its language or meaning and, therefore, must be followed,” the GAL 
opined.138  Since strict construction is mandated in this case, the GAL further 
reasoned, “[u]nmarried partners cannot defeat the plain meaning of R.C. § 3107.15 
by jointly adopting after the natural parent relinquishes her parental rights.”139   
Thus, the GAL’s circular reasoning left the parents (and others similarly situated) 
in a dizzying legal predicament.  Pursuant to the GAL’s logic, the parents could not 
utilize their most compelling argument based on Jane’s best interest, since the best 
interest provision in the adoption statute governs adoption petitions only and not 
declaratory judgment actions regarding adoption matters.  But having been denied 
use of the “best interest” language in the adoption statue, another provision of the 
adoption statute – the so-called step-parent provision - would be strictly construed 
against them to deny Tricia’s adoption of Jane unless Marcia’s rights were 
terminated. 
H.  Decision of Supreme Court of Ohio Declining Jurisdiction  
On April 28, 1999, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the appeal without an 
opinion.140  Three of the seven justices dissented both from the original denial141 and 
from the court’s subsequent rejection of the parents’ motion for reconsideration.142   
Since the Supreme Court of Ohio offered no insight as to the justices’ reasons for 
denying review, it is difficult to read anything into its decision.  In fact, it is not even 
safe to assume that the three justices who favored review were inclined to take the 
case for the purpose of reversing rather than affirming the lower court decisions.  In 
any event, the decision not to hear the case finally resolves the matter as to Marcia, 
Trish, and Jane, but it is not an affirmance per se.  Thus, it does not create binding 
statewide precedent. 
IV.  FLAWS IN THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS 
The resolution of In re Jane Doe is a classic example of courts missing not only 
the boat but the entire harbor as well.  This navigational error is due to fundamental 
flaws in application of general rules of statutory interpretation.  
As the court of appeals noted, “[t]his case is not about alternative lifestyles but 
statutory construction.”143  This is true.  But error arose in the court’s analysis of the 
                                                                
136GAL’s Memorandum at 1.   
137Id. at 2.  
138GAL’s Memorandum at 6; see also id. at 6-9. 
139Id. at 4. 
140In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 709 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 1999). 
141Justices Moyer, Douglas and Pfeifer dissented from the denial of the appeal.  Id.  
142In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 711 N.E.2d 234 (Ohio 1999). 
143719 N.E.2d at 1073. 
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case as if only one rule of statutory interpretation exists, to wit, that strict 
construction is required where statutes create rights nonexistent at common law.  
Other rules of equal or even greater influence should have informed the court’s 
decision in this case. 
Ohio’s “cardinal rule” of statutory interpretation “is that all statutes relating to 
the same general subject matter must be read in para materia.”144  Words and phrases 
are given their common meaning unless they have been assigned or have acquired a 
technical or particular meaning.145  Presumptions that accompany the enactment of 
legislation include that the “entire statute is intended to be effective” and “a just and 
reasonable result is intended.”146  If a statute is ambiguous, the courts determine an 
appropriate construction by consulting “among other things, the common law, the 
object sought to be attained by the legislature, and the consequence of a particular 
construction.”147  Conversely, where a “statute conveys a meaning that is clear, 
unequivocal and definite,”148 the court’s “interpretative effort is at an end, and the 
statute must be applied accordingly.”149  However, strict compliance with a statute is 
not required where the statute itself is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the case.150  
Finally, a “statute should not be interpreted to yield an absurd result.”151  
Accordingly, a court should reject statutory interpretation that yields “any absurd 
consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason” or that produces 
“consequences of great absurdity or injustice.”152 
As the courts and the parties readily conceded in this matter, adoption is a 
creature of statute, and thus strict statutory construction is one of the rules that guide 
the court’s decision-making process in this case.  But the interpretation adopted by 
the lower courts “strictly construes” Ohio’s adoption statutes in a manner that 
directly violates several equally compelling rules of statutory construction articulated 
above. 
                                                                
144Yonkings v. Wilkinson, 714 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ohio 1999). 
145OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.42 (Anderson 2000). 
146OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.47 (Anderson 2000). 
147Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co. Inc., 726 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ohio 2000) (citing R.C. § 1.49). 
148City of Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm., 699 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ohio 1998) 
(quoting Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1973)). 
149Id.  
150See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 703 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ohio 1999) (as a general rule, a 
defendant’s waiver of the right to have “criminal proceedings” heard by a jury does not apply 
to a waiver only relevant to the sentencing phase of the trial). 
151Mishr v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 667 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ohio 1996) (citations omitted). 
152Slater v. Cave, 3 Ohio St. 80, 83-84 (Ohio 1853).  For an excellent discussion of the 
absurd results principle, see Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: 
Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. LAW REV. 127 
(1994).  
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A.  Applying Statutory Provisions in Para Materia 
General rules of statutory construction require that related provisions of a 
statutory scheme be read in conjunction with each other to achieve the legislature’s 
intent.  Moreover, and as the court of appeals noted here, OHIO REV. CODE § 3107.14 
explicitly demands that “adoption matters must be decided on a case-by-case basis 
through the able exercise of discretion by the trial court giving due consideration to 
all known factors in determining what is in the best interest of the person to be 
adopted.”153  The supremacy of the “best interest of the child” provision has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio in decisions that have overridden literal 
statutory requirements – such as the requisite approval of the adoption agency – 
when it is in the adoptee’s best interest to do so.154   
Thus, the court of appeal’s reasoning that focuses on the best interest of the child 
“would place the ‘cart before the horse’”155 is simply incorrect.  To the contrary, both 
the legislation itself and the interpretation of the statute by the state’s highest court 
instruct Ohio courts to do exactly what the appeals court refused to do here:  always 
place the best interest of the child first.156  
The court of appeals defends its decision by distinguishing between statutory 
provisions that set the standards for assessing the merits of an adoption petition and 
the provision that governs the effects of the adoption.157  But what the appeals court 
ignores is that all these provisions are part of a single, unified statutory scheme that 
the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly recognized as being legitimately 
implemented in furtherance of the best interests of the child.  Thus, provisions 
governing the “effects” of adoption are equally entitled to interpretation under the 
best interests of the child standard. 
In addition, the court of appeal’s interpretation of the statute as terminating 
Marcia’s parental rights upon Jane’s adoption by Trish extracts a result identical to 
denying the adoption petition on the merits.  The difference is that the court’s 
decision predicated on the effects of the adoption creates a de facto bar to Jane’s 
adoption by Trish, while a ruling on the merits creates a legal bar.  But, a bar is a bar, 
regardless of the adjective that proceeds it.  In short, the court’s differential treatment 
of the “merits” and the “effects” provisions of Ohio’s adoption statutes fabricates a 
distinction where there is no difference. 
                                                                
153In re Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1072. 
154State ex rel. Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 11-12 (Ohio 
1974). 
155719 N.E.2d at 1073. 
156The irrefutable facts of this case show that Trish and Marcia are excellent parents, and 
that Trish’s adoption by Jane would be in Jane’s best interest.  See text and accompanying 
pages 13-16.  And while readily acknowledging that every adoption case must be judged on its 
own merits, the amicus curiae provided empirical, sociological and psychological data 
demonstrating that second-parent, same-sex adoptions significantly benefit the child’s mental 
and physical well-being.   
157In re Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1073. 
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B. Obtaining the Legislature’s Objectives   
The position adopted by the courts below that R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) is 
unambiguous and must be literally applied to strip Marcia of her parental rights if 
Trish adopts Jane overlooks another critical threshold step in statutory application.  
That is, the statute neither expressly addresses, nor by its language remotely 
suggests, that it covers same-sex, second-parent adoptions.  Therefore, it is simply 
irrelevant to the issues raised by second-parent adoptions.158  The statute’s 
inapplicability is one of the reasons that its application here runs contrary to the 
legislature’s intent in adopting Ohio’s statutory adoption scheme.   
R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) terminates “all parental rights and responsibilities” of any 
“biological or other legal parents of the adopted person.”  If this constituted the 
whole of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1), then the lower court’s interpretation of the statute as 
terminating biological mother Marcia’s parental rights to Jane upon Trish’s adoption 
of Jane might be appropriate. 
But R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) does not make such a universal statement.  Rather, it 
contains an important phrase limiting its applicability to the termination of parental 
rights accompanying an adoption.  That is, R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) terminates parental 
rights “[e]xcept with respect to a spouse of the petitioner and relatives of the 
spouse.”  This language has led courts, litigants and commentators to refer to such 
provisions as “the step-parent provision.”159 
The plain language of this exception makes clear that the scenario the legislature 
intended R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) to address does not exist in this case, nor does it exist 
in any case where there is only one “legal” parent of the child.  The scenario 
contemplated by the statute is where two persons (usually both biological parents) 
already possess parental rights and responsibilities, and a third party petitions to 
adopt the child.  In fact, this scenario represents the most common form of adoption 
in America.160  Absent the termination effect in R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1), the child 
would have three legally recognized parents.  The Ohio legislature has apparently 
decided that this is not a desirable result,161 and it is not alone in that decision.  
                                                                
158In this respect the step-parent provision is akin to other provisions in Ohio adoption 
law, such as the requirement that consent be obtained from an agency who has permanent 
custody of the child, or that a putative father be notified of a proposed adoption that will 
terminate his parental rights.  
159See, e.g., In re Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035, 1057 (Conn. 1999); Bates v. Sanchez, 375 
N.W.2d 353, 354 (Mich. 1985).  See generally Barbara Findlay, All in the Family Values, 14 
CAN. J. FAM. L. 129 (1997).  
160Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial 
Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 
1020, n.5 (1999). 
161Although one might argue that having more than two persons legally responsible for a 
child would be in the child’s best interest, potential downsides to such a scenario are obvious.  
Having three (or more) people with equal parental rights in the eyes of the law, who may have 
some animosity toward each other based on the break up of past marriages or relationships, 
could result in repeated visits to the court over disputes such as the religious training the child 
should receive, the educational path to be followed, whether a particular course of medical 
treatment should be pursued, and other issues intrinsic to child rearing.  In short, there is some 
wisdom in the law limiting the chorus of voices that have standing regarding the critical 
decisions attendant to raising children.  
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Indeed, “courts have acknowledged that allowing one or both of the biological 
parents to retain parental rights would greatly complicate raising the child without 
affording a benefit to justify the complication”162 in cases where the adoption would 
already create two legal parents.  
The critical point overlooked by the court of appeals is that in such step-parent 
situations, R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) preserves, rather than terminates, the rights of the 
existing legal parent who supports the adoption of her child by the petitioner.  Thus, 
the court’s application here of R.C. § 3107.15 to terminate the rights of the sole 
existing legal and biological parent is antithetical to the purpose of a statute that 
seeks to ensure – through the preservation of one existing legal relationship and the 
creation of another - two legal parents for the adopted child.    
The court of appeal’s interpretation of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) as mandating 
termination of Marcia’s rights is contradicted by the very Supreme Court of Ohio 
cases that the court of appeals cites in support for its “strict construction” holding.  
Collectively, Kaylor v. Bruening,163 Smith v. Smith,164 and In re Adoption of Greer165 
recognize that R.C. § 3107.15(A) terminates the rights of some biological parents.  
These cases do not hold, however, as the court of appeals suggests,166 that all 
biological parents’ rights are terminated.167  To the contrary, two of these cases – 
Kaylor and Greer – are stepparent situations.  In both those cases the parental rights 
of the biological parent who is a spouse of the petitioner are expressly preserved.  
Moreover, the court in each case construed R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) narrowly in light of 
constitutional, statutory, and case law that demand protection “of the right of the 
natural parents to raise and nurture their children.”168  The court in these cases 
expressly sought to further the “noble objective” of preserving the child-parent 
relationship, a relationship that the court characterized as “a bond which constitutes 
one of the most fundamental relationships upon which our society is based.”169 
                                                                
162Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial 
Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 
1022 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
163684 N.E.2d 1228 (Ohio 1997). 
164662 N.E.2d 366 (Ohio 1996). 
165638 N.E.2d 999 (Ohio 1994). 
166719 N.E.2d at 1072. 
167Both Greer and Kaylor are classic step-parent adoptions where the right of the 
biological parent married to the petitioner were preserved rather than destroyed by the 
adoption. 
168Greer, 638 N.E.2d at 1005. 
169Greer, 638 N.E.2d at 1003.  Thus, in Greer, the court held that a putative father’s right 
to contest adoption by the biological mother’s spouse was not waived by failing to file an 
objection within thirty days as required by a strict reading of the applicable statute.  In Smith, 
the court held that an adoption petition approved by South Africa upon consent of one 
biological parent may be contrary to the law and public policy of Ohio, thus denying the South 
African judgment full faith and credit.   
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The foregoing analysis does not suggest, as one of the court of appeals judges 
feared,170 that the step-parent provision protects Marcia’s parental rights because 
Trish qualifies as a “spouse” of Marcia.  To the contrary, Trish is qualified to adopt 
Jane because she meets the statutory requirement of being “an unmarried adult”171 
who cannot, in Ohio, be recognized as Marcia’s spouse.172  Rather, the usual effect of 
R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) to limit a child to two legal parents, demonstrates that the 
legislature did not intend the biological mother’s rights to be terminated in the 
scenario presented in In re Jane Doe.  Simply stated, “the law accords protections to 
a natural parent when the adoption of a child is proposed.”173  This shield is designed 
to protect a child such as Jane by providing two legally recognized parents.  It should 
not, therefore, be used as a sword to sever Jane’s legal relationship with her 
biological parent. 
C.  Avoiding Absurd Results 
Invoking any provision of Ohio adoption statutes to sever the legal relationship 
between a child and a biological mother who has been and intends to continue being 
an excellent parent is absurd when weighed against the intent of the legislature to 
create loving, stable homes, frequently consisting of two parents, for children.  This 
absurd result can and should be avoided.   
Courts outside of Ohio have taken this path.  In a 1993 decision,174 for example, 
Vermont’s highest court refused to apply that state’s statutory step-parent provision 
to terminate the parental rights of the birth mother upon adoption of her two-children 
by the mother’s same sex partner.  The court reasoned: 
The intent of the legislature was to protect the security of family units by 
defining the legal rights and responsibility of children who find 
themselves in circumstances that do not include two biological parents.  
Despite the narrow wording of the step-parent exception, we cannot 
conclude that the legislature ever meant to terminate the parental rights of 
a biological parent who intended to continue raising a child with the help 
of a partner.  Such a narrow construction would produce the unreasonable 
and irrational result of defeating adoptions that are otherwise indisputably 
in the best interests of children.175 
A New York court reached the same conclusion, recognizing that enforcement of 
New York’s step-parent provision to terminate the biological partner’s rights “would 
be an absurd outcome which would nullify the advantage sought by the proposed 
adoption:  the creation of a legal family unit identical to the actual family setup.”176  
                                                                
170719 N.E.2d at 1073 (Wise, J., concurring). 
171Id. at 1072. 
172Id at 1073 (Wise, J., concurring). 
173Smith, 662 N.E.2d at 369. 
174Adoptions of B.L.V.D. and E.I.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). 
175Id. at 1274. 
176In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992). 
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Accordingly, Ohio courts should hold that R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) has no application 
to same-sex, second parent adoptions.   
An alternative, equally defendable analysis pursuant to the rule of statutory 
construction prohibiting absurd results entails holding the step-parent provision 
applicable by analogy.  In that application, Marcia is deemed directly analogous to 
the “spouse” excepted from the parental termination effects of R.C. § 3107.15.  
Thus, Marcia’s parental status is unaffected by Trish’s adoption of Jane.  Ohio cases 
such as Lawson v. Atwood 177 provide precedent for such an analysis.  
The Lawson plaintiff sought recovery under the Ohio Wrongful Death Statute178 
for the death of Gina Lawson, an 18-year-old he had raised as his own child.  The 
court described the relationship between Lawson and his decedent, Gina Lawson, as 
follows:  
The evidence is undisputed that Gina, from age two until her death sixteen 
years later, lived with appellant, and that he loved her and treated her as if 
she were his natural child.  He received Gina’s society, companionship, 
and filial obedience.  He represented Gina to the world as his child and he 
received the benefits of her love and affection as though he were her 
natural father.179   
Following Gina’s death in an automobile accident, plaintiff initiated a wrongful 
death suit against the driver and the owner of the other vehicle.  The trial court 
granted and the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants because 
plaintiff had never adopted Gina, and thus was not a legally recognized “parent” 
entitled to a remedy for her death under the literal language of the statute.180  The 
Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously reversed. 
In recognizing plaintiff’s standing to pursue the claim, the court characterized the 
wrongful death act as remedial in nature.  Being remedial, it “must be construed to 
promote the objectives of the Act and to assist the parties in obtaining justice.”181  
The court recognized three objectives of the Act: “(1) to compensate those who have 
been deprived of a relationship, (2) to ensure that tortfeasors bear the cost of 
wrongful acts, and (3) to deter harmful conduct which may result in death.”182 
The court rejected the doctrine of “equitable adoption” as grounds for 
recognizing plaintiff’s standing, stating that “indiscriminate application of such a 
                                                                
177536 N.E.2d 1167 (Ohio 1989). 
178OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01-.02 (West 2000).  The statute allows designated 
parties to sue for an intentional or negligent act of another that results in death.  OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (West 2000).  The action is brought in the name of the personal 
representative of the decedent “for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, 
and parents of the decedent, all of whom are rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by 
reason of the wrongful death, and for the exclusive benefit of the other next of kin of the 
decedent.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (West 2000). 
179536 N.E.2d at 1169. 
180Id. at 1168. 
181Id. (citations omitted). 
182Id. (citations omitted). 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/13
2000] SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION 127 
broad legal principle is not desirable.”183  The court also acknowledged “a dearth of 
authority to guide our application of the Ohio Wrongful Death Act to the facts of this 
case.”184  Thus, the purpose of the statute – “to permit a recovery from the tortfeasor 
for the loss occasioned by the wrongful death”185 – was the sole guide the court had 
for determining whether the statutory specification of “parent” includes persons 
similarly situated to the plaintiff.   
The court concluded that the purpose of the statute was furthered by allowing 
plaintiff and others similarly situated to pursue a wrongful death claim, provided that 
plaintiffs “established a parental relationship by clear and convincing evidence.”186  
The court further articulated a four-factor test for establishing the requisite child-
parent relationship.  The test requires proof that the plaintiff had “performed the 
obligations of parenthood for a substantial period of time,”187 and that “[t]he 
relationship between the child and the one claiming to be parent had been publicly 
recognized.”188  
Lawson is instructive to the court’s analysis of In re Jane Doe for at least four 
reasons.  First, both the adoption and wrongful death statutes create rights and 
remedies unknown at common law.189  Thus, strict construction of the statutes’ 
provisions is implicated.  Second, the statutes in each case are remedial in nature.190  
As a general rule, remedial statutes are liberally construed.191  This second factor 
militates against absolute strict construction that narrows the remedies provided 
under the statutes.192  Third, both statutes are predicated on a traditional family model 
                                                                
183Id. at 1169. 
184536 N.E.2d at 1169. 
185Id.  
186Id. 
187Id. at 1170. 
188Id. 
189At common law, remedies for personal injuries died with the person who suffered them.  
Accordingly, the right to sue for wrongful death in Ohio is a statutorily created right that was 
not recognized at common law.  Rubeck v. Huffman, 374 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio 1978). 
190In the wrongful death situation, the statute provides a remedy for the death of a loved 
one; in adoption matters, the remedy sought is establishing one or more legally recognized 
parent responsible for the care and well being of a child. 
191Lawson, 536 N.E.2d at 1168.  See also Barker v. State, 402 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio 1980) 
(statute that is remedial in nature should be given liberal construction to assist parties in 
obtaining justice); Lorms v. State, 357 N.E.2d 1067 (Ohio 1976) (same); McKenzie v. Racing 
Comm., 215 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1966) (same).  
192The Lawson decision omits any reference to the Wrongful Death Act as being in 
derogation of common law, thus requiring strict construction, while the In re Jane Doe 
decision omits any reference to adoption statutes being remedial in nature, thus requiring 
liberal construction.  These omissions are interesting in light of the characterizations of these 
statutes in Supreme Court of Ohio cases.  See, e.g., In re Zschach, 665 N.E.2d at 1076 (“strict 
construction does not require that we interpret statutes in such a manner that would mandate 
an unjust or unreasonable result,” especially one contrary to the best interest of the child). 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
128 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:101 
that is incongruent with the realities of modern-day families.193  Fourth, the key terms 
at issue – “parent” in Lawson and “spouse” in In re Jane Doe – are not defined in the 
statutes or by judicial precedent to encompass the parties before the courts.   
Absent express statutory definitions or common meaning of words that offer 
clarity when a statute is applied to a situation not contemplated by the legislature, the 
intent of the legislature is the guiding principle in statutory interpretation and 
application.  This principle was clearly effectuated by the unanimous Supreme Court 
of Ohio’s decision in Lawson to equate the plaintiff – a de facto parent - with a 
legally recognized parent based on the classical parental role he played during the 
child’s lifetime.  The same principle was entirely and inappropriately abandoned by 
the courts in In re Jane Doe, despite Trish and Marcia’s long-standing relationship 
and continued commitment as Jane’s parents.  Surely, legal recognition of a child-
parent relationship in cases like Jane’s, where the parties will receive a lifetime of 
peace of mind and emotional and financial security through this recognition, is at 
least of equal value to legal recognition of a child-parent relationship upon the death 
of a child for the purpose of providing monetary compensation (albeit totally 
inadequate) for the parent’s loss. 
D.  Declaring a Live Issue Moot  
As noted previously, the parents presented an alternative, independent argument 
to the probate and appeals courts: Jane’s best interests could be furthered, and 
adoption laws fully satisfied, if Marcia voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to 
Jane and then immediately re-established that child-parent relationship through the 
adoption of Jane by both Marcia and Trish.  Both courts held that this issue was moot 
in light of their decisions that the stepparent provision of R.C. § 3105.15(A)(1) 
prohibited Trish from adopting without automatically terminating Marcia’s legal 
relationship.  Both courts were wrong in declaring this issue moot. 
“Unless an assignment of error is made moot by a ruling on another assignment 
of error,” an Ohio appeals court must “decide each assignment of error and give 
reasons in writing for its decision.”194  Clearly, a court has no duty to fully address an 
assignment of error when it is rendered moot by the court’s previous discussion or 
where some other intervening factor has negated the issue.195  “Actions become moot 
when resolution of the issues presented is purely academic and will have no practical 
effect on the legal relations between the parties.”196  
The parents’ second assignment of error was not “purely academic,” as it would 
create new legal relationships among the parties in this case.  Marcia’s status as 
Jane’s biological mother would terminate, but be immediately replaced with the 
child-parent relationship between Jane and her “new” parents, Marcia and Tricia.  
                                                                
193As recently recognized by the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he demographic 
changes in the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.”  Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  See also JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: 
RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE (1996). 
194OHIO APP. R. 12(A)(1)(c). 
195See, e.g., Miner v. Witt, 92 N.E. 21 (Ohio 1910). 
196Wagner v. Cleveland, 574 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); see also Turner v. 
Cleveland School District, 651 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).  
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Stated differently, the effect of the Ohio step-parent provision that the courts below 
cited as determinative of this case – that is, the termination of Marcia’s parental 
rights if Trish adopts Jane–is rendered wholly inapplicable if Marcia voluntarily 
terminates her rights.  This presents an entirely different scenario where Jane, for one 
brief moment, has no legal parents.  Thus, the re-adoption by Marcia and Trish 
would not trigger the step-parent provision.197    
V.  CONCLUSION 
Ohio adoption statutes do not expressly apply to cases like In re Jane Doe, and 
the rules of legislative intent, statutory application and construction provide 
significant leeway for courts to determine whether such adoptions should be allowed 
and the effects of such adoptions.  The arguments articulated above demonstrate that 
the courts adjudicating In re Jane Doe could have, consistent with sound legal 
analysis, and should have, consistent with the best interest of Jane and similarly 
situated children, found the adoption of Jane by Trish allowable under Ohio law 
without the termination of the biological mother’s rights.  So why the opposite 
result? 
The possibility of insidious bias against gay parents cannot be overlooked.  Judge 
Wise’s concurrence reflects fear of starting down that slippery slope –if this type of 
adoption is permitted, gay marriages cannot be far behind.  But such fears are 
unfounded.  Allowing Trish to adopt Jane does not change her legal status vis-à-vis 
Marcia.  The adoption would provide standing for Marcia to seek judicial 
intervention if Trish fails to honor her legal obligations to Jane.  But such 
intervention would be on Jane’s behalf and for Jane’s benefit, not Marcia’s.   
Courts resolving custody and visitation cases have almost uniformly rejected 
sexual orientation as a reason to deny a parent’s access to a child.  This trend is due, 
in no small part, to the ever-growing and virtually uncontested empirical data 
demonstrating that gay and lesbian parents are just as qualified as their heterosexual 
counterparts to raise healthy and well-adjusted children.  Courts have also 
recognized the value of having a legal as well as emotional and psychological bond 
to more than one parent.  A number of states have interpreted and applied their 
adoption laws to accommodate these realities.198  A few states, including Ohio, have 
refused to so do.199  But any state truly motivated to serve the best interests of their 
                                                                
197The point offered here is simply that the courts should have considered this independent 
argument made by the parents.  However, pursuing this avenue is not without risks.  For 
example, when Marcia’s rights as biological mother are terminated, Jane has, in the eyes of the 
law, no legal parents.  This technically renders her a ward of the state, and arguably triggers 
additional considerations under Ohio’s adoption statutes, such as the requirement of obtaining 
a home study and consent to the proposed adoption by the agency charged with Jane’s care.  
These requirements might all be satisfied before Marcia’s rights are terminated, but this would 
require significant coordination between Marcia, Trish, the probate court, and any other 
official entity that gains standing in the matter when Jane is “parentless.”  
198See M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M. and 
D.M. to Adopt Olivia M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 1995); In re Adoption of Two Children by 
H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 
1993); In re Jacob, 600 N.E.2d 397, 405-06 (N.Y. 1995): Adoptions of B.L.V.D. & E.L.V.B., 
628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993).  
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children will reject archaic models of family life and allow second parent adoptions, 
as long as it is in the best interest of the children involved to do so.   
A New Jersey court expressed the rationale for granting second-parent adoptions 
quite eloquently: 
This case arises at a time of great change and a time of recognition that, 
while the families of the past may have seemed simple formations 
repeated with uniformity, the so called ‘traditional families’ have always 
been complex, multifaceted, and idealized. . . . We cannot continue to 
pretend that there is one formula or correct pattern that should constitute a 
family in order to achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe 
children should inhabit.  This court finds that the family before it is 
providing a secure, stable, and nurturing environment for the child. . . . 
[The adopting parent] is one of the two cornerstones of this supportive 
home, and beyond all other issues it is upon this factor that this court 
primarily rules in granting this petition for adoption.200  
This could – and should - have been the concluding paragraph in In re Jane Doe. 
                                                          
199See In re Adoption of Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1998); Georgia G. v. Terry M., 
516 N.W. 2d 678, 684 (Wisc. 1994).  
200Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993). 
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